BLF - OHS - CHAPTER FOUR - 21st C: FRAMEWORKS FOR FEAR
building or construction worker was killed almost every week between 1996
and 2005. Since 1995, their death rate has fallen by a third but is still
three times higher than the average across the economy. The industry also
has the highest number of work-related injuries requiring hospitalisation.
“Unacceptable” was the word that Royal Commissioner Cole chose to
describe this toll in 2003 when 41 building workers were killed.
of every size fail in their legal duty to ensure safe workplaces. In
October 2000, a Leighton’s worker died, and three suffered serious
injuries, from the collapse of 70-tonne concrete bridge beam. In
convicting the corporation, judge Gebhardt accused it of “gross
shoddiness” and condemned its failure to mention the incident in its
In 2004, a crane operator with Baulderstone Hornibrook died because its
managers failed to allow for the effects of the weather. Meanwhile, the
performances of a trio of smaller operators represented the harms
inflicted every day. In May 2002, two labourers were removing a section of
the roof at Kew Secondary College when one fell three metres to the
concrete floor; the site manager told the second man to keep going. On 23
March 2003, a 66-year-old labourer died after falling through a hole in a
roof he had been removing; WorkCover detailed five breaches of the
regulations. In the third case, a Bendigo scaffolding contractor began a
demolition in October 2004 but kept its harnesses and other safety gear
back at headquarters.
such violence has been hobbled by Cole’s 2003 Report,
followed by the Building and Construction Industry Improvement (BCII) Act
of 2005, the Australian Building and Construction Commission (ABCC) and
the Office of the Federal Safety Commissioner (OFSC). The partisanship of
this quartet is illustrated by bans on union-run safety courses, the bar
against job delegates being safety officers, limits on right-of-entry and
by a distortion of “ingrained culture”. The lop-sidedness infects the
OFSC through its reliance on market forces and “risk management”. The
Cole Commission demonstrated its myopia by not detecting a trade in
certificates of competence. These matters are examined in this chapter.
peddled his line about the unions’ misuse of OHS after being stung by
complaints that he was ignoring the bosses’ law-breaking when they put
workers’ lives at risk. He assured grieving families of what a
soft-hearted judge he had always been.
His Final Report returned to his
initial prejudices by pretending that only one of the 88 “types of
inappropriate conduct which exist throughout the building and construction
industry” involved “employers[’] failing to observe proper
Occupational and Health procedures.” His eight other mentions of health
and safety attacked the unions for being too vigilant.
In addition, he papered over the tardiness of his Commission’s concern
for safety by announcing that there was “no more important subject.”
If so, why had his staff not subjected OHS to the same scrutiny as other
aspects of the industry? Cole allocated only one volume out of
twenty-three to Occupational Health and Safety, with glimpses in the
volumes for each State.
He excused this imbalance on the ground that his brief had been to expose
“to the public gaze aspects of practices in the industry not previously
Hence, he had to concentrate on coercion by unions and improper payments
to their officials. How was it that such allegations were not “publicly
known”? Had Cole never heard of the de-registrations of 1974 and 1986,
the Joint Victorian and Commonwealth Royal Commission into Gallagher, and
the 1991-2 Gyles Royal Commission in NSW?
comment that workplace injury and disease were already well known is all
too true. That knowledge had been available before the first British laws
attempted to limit such hazards in 1802. What is less well known to the
public is the refusal of employers to obey that legislation and the
failure of the legal system to treat its violation as criminal.
had also to explain why he did not expose to “public gaze” a single
case of corruption on the part of union officials. He said that he had
sealed that evidence in a “Secret Volume” to preserve the officials’
rights to fair trials. Despite the ferocity of the government’s assault
on the construction unions, no charge has been laid on the basis of
Cole’s material. Meanwhile, that evidence has justified attacks on the
building unions, without identifying one official as a possible crook. [As
Royal Commissioner into kickbacks by the Australian Wheat Board to the
Iraqi regime, Cole again upheld the presumption of innocence for Ministers
in the Coalition government, since his Report
named names only from within the Board.]
leaders are threatening to maintain this anti-labour regime, contrary to
Party policy. In 2007, as an earnest of this goodwill towards Messrs
Construction Capital, opposition leader K. Rudd initiated the expulsion of
the assistant-secretary of the WA Construction Division, Joe McDonald,
from the ALP because he had called a boss a “fucking thieving parasite
dog”. A few weeks later, on 5 July, concrete work collapsed on that
site. Which event was the more violent and intimidating: foul language or
a falling section? Not a word of criticism came from ALP leaders against
the firm in charge of that life-threatening incident, not even after a
panel from the Safety Institute of Australia (WA) specified 57 other OHS
Instead, Rudd buckled to a Liberal Party internet campaign by sealing
McDonald’s expulsion from the ALP the day after the court acquitted him
of trespass. His hanging offence had been to assure reporters that, unlike that
“burnt-out dictator”, John
Howard, “I’ll be back” to organise
against “getting robbed by unscrupulous bosses”.
K. Rudd found these words “incendiary”, with no place in “a more
modern industrial relations system.”
He again pledged the ALP to maintain a system condemned by the
International Labour Organisation. In office, Minister Gillard has refused
to turn the police-state powers of her Australian Building and
Construction Commission against the bosses for their culture of crime and
ABCC justified its moves against unionists on the grounds that those
proceedings “served the public interest by bringing about cultural
change in the building and construction industry.”
That claim was true in so far as the Construction Division of the CFMEU in
Victoria no longer walked off, with no loss of pay, for a day after a
fatality. Given the rarity of OHS prosecutions, this direct action had
offered a deterrent which was immediate and hit employers where it hurt.
In stamping out the “deaths-in-industry” stoppages, the ABCC boasted
that it had saved millions in productivity but said narry a word about
saving a single live.
the ABCC Annual Reports have not
mentioned on-site safety is inevitable since the regulations gave the
Commission no procedures with which to enforce the relevant sections of
Code or Guidelines. The ABCC does not pursue contractors on whose sites
workers are being harmed. Instead, after injuries to two Sydney workers,
the Construction police went after the unions’ right-of-entry permits.
an instant walk-off is the most effective way to improve health and
safety, the organiser who gains entry can get action only after
time-consuming procedures. In 1999-2000, Victorian WorkCover Authority had
demonstrated the necessity for swift action when it stopped nearly 1,400
building sites or practices as “immediate risks”.
Despite those results, the Victorian ALP’s Amendments in 2,004 were as
restrictive as the Howard’s government’s Building and Construction
Industry Improvement Act. A union in that State has to apply to a
magistrate for an entry permit and to specify the problem in advance; the
official is not allowed to look into other violations uncovered in the
course of that inspection.
The ABCC justifies its limitations on the right-of-entry because of what
it calls the “ingrained culture” of building workers and their unions.
I hear the word “Culture”
culture in the industry is that the criminal [and OHS] law does not apply
because industrial circumstances are involved. The attitude is that the
applicability of industrial [and OHS] law is optional because there is no
body whose function it is to enforce it, or which has the will, capacity
and resources to do so….
are four principles which should drive cultural change:
the boundary between lawful and unlawful
industrial [and OHS] activity must be clearly delineated;
unlawful conduct [around OHS] must
attract serious consequences so that the rule of law may be
those who, by unlawful [OHS] conduct or
practices cause other participants in the industry loss should bear the
cost of the losses they cause; and
there should be an independent monitoring
and prosecuting authority in the industry to monitor conduct, and uphold
the rule of law [on OHS].
Report failed to make recommendations of this stringency for OHS –
despite his admission that no issue was “more important.”
boasting that the ABCC has encouraged sub-contractors to assert their
its Chairman, John Lloyd, ignored how those rights become a licence to
violate OHS requirements and not to pay entitlements.
Although Chairman Lloyd came from the National Crime Authority, he
found no evidence of underpayment of superannuation contributions in his
first Report and, by 2006-07,
had identified only two cases.
Meanwhile, the Tax Office had retrieved $93m. from 234 offenders.
If this disparity is not a sign of incompetence, is it evidence that,
contrary to Lloyd’s protestations of impartiality, “the ABCC
concentrates on a particular category of industry participant for
ABCC is also silent on the culture of other law enforcement agencies. Ever
since the convicts, Australian police forces have benefited from their
“ingrained culture” of coercion and corruption. That “course of
conduct” was rampant in the Victorian and West Australian police during
the years of Cole, and while the ABCC was recruiting escapees from those
Safety and Compensation Council came up with its own twist on
“culture” to explain why building workers were to blame for
their higher-than-average rates of injury, In deciding that three
features put these workers at risk - their nomadic habits, a blokey
outlook and youthfulness - the Council overlooked that employers prize
those characteristics among their labouring force because they facilitate
That contractors have always been on the look out for young blokes who
accept risks also escaped the notice of the Brisbane-based consultancy,
Onetest. This firm produces “psychometric assessments” of a million
employees a year to help managers identify the attitudes of applicants
towards risk. Onetest does not
rank employers to let wage-earners decide whether it is safe to work for
Nor do calls for genetic tests in the workplace extend to determining the
suitability of bosses.
Like Cole, the ABCC and the Safety and Compensation Council, Onetest
cannot understand that “culture” is determined by the struggle between
of mass distraction
side-lining the work that unionists perform every hour of day, Admass
makes the “ingrained culture” as defined by the Construction police
seem natural. To reinforce its version, the ABCC practices trial-by-media
in passing along to television networks the videos that its inspectors
take of unionists going toe-to-toe with bosses. Those grabs are shown
without the build-up of feelings fueled by underpayment and OHS
screen, workplace injuries are silenced along with the contribution that
human labour makes to wealth. That absence is remarkable. After all,
dramas on the triv are a mish-mash of crime, medicine and law enforcement.
The intersection of those three concerns is also the stuff of OHS and
compensation. WorkSafe Annual Reports offer a starting place to script Bones
of Building, a series where Dr Bone is an OHS inspector within the
construction industry. This scenario suggests a Logie-winning formula -
until the exploitation of labour is remembered.
series such as GP individualised
the causes of injury to workers who presented at the surgery, never
sheeting blame home to systemic cost-cutting and speed-up. Should
workplace injuries appear in a story, they are caused by “rotten
apples” among the otherwise honest employers - or are just bad luck.
Another index of this slant is that the triv’s storylines revel in the
sex lives of on-screen police, gangsters, surgeons, soldiers, nurses and
solicitors. Yet those characters rarely suffer from workplace injuries and
diseases. More triv detectives get shot in the course of duty, than are
cursed with lower-back pain from stake-outs.
duty of Admass is to divert attention from the miseries of employment, as
the Managing Director of the Nine Network appreciated in 1970:
triv offers workers a warm-bath after their being exhausted by the job,
supplying a soporific, not a stimulus to thoughtful activism.
capital needs Admass to do more than distract wage-slaves from their
workaday blues. After individual capitals have extracted their pounds of
flesh at work, they compete to get that wage back by exciting the viewer
to spend. The networks are not in business to remind viewers of what they
have endured to gain their spending power,
anymore than they alert workers to how much pain they will have to bear in
keeping up their mortgage and credit-card repayments.
Admass distraction distorts the significance of workplace relationships,
its outpourings are less effective at shaping attitudes than is one’s
own job. The $237m. that the Coalition spent promoting WorkChoices could
not erase the understanding that workers had gained from their experiences
of employment in a market regulated by and for corporates. Activity
conditions our thoughts far more than amusements or propaganda can
determine our experience. That we become what we do is confirmed by the
culture of work inside the Cole Commission and at the ABCC.
from adopting this suggestion, the ABCC preserved its impartiality by
financing a lavish suite in which to interrogate labourers.
In somewhat less plush surrounds, though perched on ergonomic chairs in
air-conditioned courtrooms, industrial magistrates are in danger of
slicing a finger on a sheet of paper as they decide whether a stoppage was
justified by “a reasonable concern by the employees about an imminent
from the hazards of building work contributed to making the first Progress Report from the Office of the Federal Safety Commissioner
into a monument to bureaucratic blather, meriting a prize for the largest
number of weasel words per page in any public document. When the
Commissioner was not “championing a cooperate approach”, he was
“identifying and sharing best practice and facilitating shared
responsibility for improvement through consultation, collaboration and
communication.” Needless to say, that gentleman saw his job as an
“audit to improve, not inspecting to enforce.” 
As an apt aid to artful alliteration, the Report
was transparent about its priority of putting words above action. The
OFSC’s second Report for
2006-7 confirmed its preference for rhetoric over substance by
acknowledging little improvement in safety on sites while boasting that a
“key achievement” had been the completion of an internal review.
learnt that cutting back on health and safety was a way for employers to
squeeze in under their tender prices. To stay in business, firms accepted
contracts on which they knew they were going to lose money on “suicide
bids”, which could turn murderous for the workers.
What Cole could not admit is that market failure is not an exception to be
corrected but, rather, is how capital succeeds at expanding. Had Cole been
in earnest, he should have recommended matching the client’s penalties
on a contractor who runs late with fines on both sets of capitalists
whenever the rate of injury on a project exceeded that for the whole
correct the market, the Safety Commissioner planned to accredit
construction companies before they could bid for larger government
contracts. His Office weighted its criteria for accreditation towards a
corporation’s demonstrating that it had an OHS plan. This enthusiasm for
documentation overlooked the finding by the Royal Commission into the ESSO
explosion at Longford that the corporation’s safety manuals had been so
elaborate as to be “repetitive, circular” and “impenetrable”.
In another case, a firm submitted “a model safety plan that it had put
into operation at the time” of an employee’s death in 1996.
“Model” on this occasion did not mean that it worked. Had it done so,
the worker would not have been killed. Instead, “model” meant that the
firm had ticked all the boxes on a form so as to look good in court.
Enthusiasm for market forces led the OFSC to disparage the evidence of harms from compensation payouts as “lag indicators”. Instead, its Commissioner found merit in “Positive Performance Indicators” (PPIs). “Lag” sounds down-beat compared with “positive performance”. The difference is that Indicators are promises and paperwork whereas lag indicators record actual injuries. The weakness in relying on compensation statistics is not that they lag behind the assaults, but that the authorities so rarely use those numbers to prosecute. Moreover, the PPIs consist of audits, meetings, safety inspections, the fraction of staff being trained and the hazards identified. The sole practical element in an OFSC audit was the rectification of hazards, although the Office undermined that step since improvements were to accord with “an appropriate risk-management approach.”
WorkSafe complained in 2001 that contractors had welcomed “risk
management” as a justification for doing no more than deal with safety
problems as they arose. This “perversion was broadly recognised as an
The safety manager for John Holland suspected that plenty of employers
looked on a Job Safety Analysis as “some mechanical steps that have to
be done because the law says so and we know we won’t really follow it
A safety consultant criticised the risk-based approach because he had met
so many employers “who are not acting responsibly.” Even for the rest,
he feared that
No government has ever appointed enough risk assessors, and those who reached the workface faced no statutory requirement to be trained or qualified. Where tests existed for on competency, the market supplied fake certificates.
the self-employed and employers had differing reasons for buying these
tickets and assessments. Their justifications underline why neither market
forces nor the good will of employers will hold down rates of death and
injury in the construction sector.
Employees: Some workers
bought the fake documents on the oldest of grounds – to put food on
their tables. A labourer who paid $1,000 to get certificates for
carpentry, dogging, forklift and hoist confessed: “I wasn’t sure
whether to do it because I knew I was wrong. I have a young family to
think about and extra money would help a lot.”
In several cases, the workers who bought the Tickets were experienced and
competent for the skills covered by the false documents. They had been
doing those tasks for years but had difficulty in explaining how to do so
on an exam paper. Some held Permits to perform the work for which they
bought Tickets. One WorkSafe inspector excused his corruption:
other cases, the workers who paid for phoney qualifications put at risk
their own lives, those of their fellow workers and of passers-by.
were useful to so-called independents since the more skills for which they
held a licence, the better chance they had of being hired, and the more
they expected to earn. A larger fraction of these workers were called upon
to perform tasks for which they had neither training, certification nor
experience, making them a danger to everyone, as one more instance of the
threats posed by sub-sub-contracting outside EBAs.
bought tickets for their employees in order to switch them from one
“trade” or “skill” to another and thus save on time costs. The
owner of a bricklaying concern explained the benefits to his business from
admission illustrates one more way in which the force of the market
threatens safety in the drive to reduce time-costs.
Transfield – again
All three reasons for going after fake Tickets collided when Transfield
bought certificates for some of its employees. Transfield’s addiction to
violating OHS regulations across its 50 years was outlined in the previous
Even Cole found fault with Transfield’s safety record on the Melbourne
In a move typical of those violations, the managers on Sydney’s
Northside Tunnel hired
inexperienced and untrained people to replace battlers for safety.
Transfield attempted this switch-over just as the project was coming to
its end, with the rush to finish on time and within budget. If attention
to safety slowed the operation, Transfield stood to lose money.
the days before the Australian Building and Construction Commission,
Transfield could not get away with sacking union activists just because
they were insisting on a safe workplace. The firm had to get around the
custom that the order of dismissal be in accord with the number of Tickets
that the workers held. The chairman of the On-the-Job Safety Committee
told the ICAC:
the Transfield managers purchased phony Tickets for the newcomers to
justify employing them in place of the activists. In response, the Safety
Committee chairman bought himself an Excavator’s Ticket to hold onto his
place. When the job ended, he suffered the consequences of being “deemed
too safe”, as he told the ICAC: “The last two and a half years I have
been out of work … because of some of the issues that I used to raise,
and I believe that’s filtered through to the tunneling industry.”
Had the ABCC existed when this worker was battling for safety, its police
would have gone after him. As it was, Transfield escaped prosecution,
while the unionist suffered the maximum penalty for a worker - the loss of
Cole’s terms of reference allowed his Commission to pursue the trade in
fake Tickets, his presumption of guilt by the workers because of their
“ingrained culture” served as an insurance policy against a repetition
of the derailing of the Royal Commissions into the Painters and Dockers
and into Building Productivity. The state had set up those investigations
to cripple unions only to expose the big end of town through its
bottom-of-the-harbour tax evasions and collusive tendering. If industrial
action by unionists is criminal, why are the violations of health and
safety laws by employers not treated as real crimes?
harrowing of labourers by the Cole Royal Commission and by the
construction police is normal for capitalist justice and parliamentary
politics. The attacks are not signs of creeping fascism but carry forward
the class nature of bourgeois democracy and law, as documented throughout
this study, and conceptualised in the concluding chapter, “Killing no
 National Safety (NS), February 2006, p. 20; Office of the Federal Safety Commissioner (OFSC), Progress (sic) Report, 2005-6, p. 8; Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry (RC), Final Report, Canberra, 2003, volume 6, pp. 136-41, 145 and 157.
 RC, Final Report, volume 1, p. 39; NS, July 2007, p. 6, November 2007, p. 6; RC, Workplace Health and Safety in the Building and Construction Industry, Canberra, 2002, Discussion Paper 7, p. 27.
Prosecutions: a summary of
prosecutions brought by the Victorian WorkCover Authority, VWA,
RC, Final Report, vol. 6,
pp. 106-7; Greg Foley, “Construction industry occupational health
safety performance overview, Australia 1992-93”, Journal of Occupational Health and Safety Australia and New Zealand, (JOH&S
ANZ), 13 (1), February 1997, p. 81.
 RC, Final Report, vol. 14, pp. 63-64; vol. 6, chapter 3.
 RC, Final Report, vol. 1, pp. 6-10.
 RC, Final Report, vol. 6, p. 5.
 RC, Final Report, vol. 14, pp. 63-64.
 RC, Final Report, vol. 6, p. 6.
 Caroline Overington, Kickback: inside the Australian Wheat Board Scandal, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2007, pp. 250-1.
Liz Ross, “Building Unions and Government ‘Reform’: The
Challenge for Unions”, Journal
of Australian Political Economy, 56, December 2005, pp. 172-85.
Sydney Morning Herald (SMH),
 Contractor, September 2007, p. 2.
 West Australian, 26 October, p. 9, 27 October, p. 7 and 29 October 2007, p. 1; would Pastor Bonhoeffer have approved of his epigone’s denial of due process?
 ABCC, Annual Report, pp. 52-3; Annual Report, 2006-7, p. 24.
 NSCA’s Australian Safety, November 2000, p. 55; ABCC, Annual Report, 2005-6, p. 51; see also Annual Report, 2006-07, p. 41.
 ABCC, Annual Report, 2006-7, p. 41.
 ABCC, Annual Report, 2005-06, pp. 50-51.
 ABCC, Annual Report, 2005-6, pp. 50-51; Annual Report, 2006-7, p. 41.
 NS, October 2007, p. 6.
 NS, May 2006, pp. 24-26; October 2007, p. 6.
 NSCA’s Australian Safety, November 2000, p. 54.
 Peter Rozen, “Significant Change or Merely Fine-Tuning? The Occupational Health and Safety Act, 2004 (Vic)”, Australian Journal of Labour Law (AJLL), 18 (1), April 2005, pp. 84-86; cf. W. J. Ford, “Being There: Changing Union Rights of Entry Under Federal Industrial Law”, AJLL, 13 (1), June 2000, pp. 1-27; NS, September 2005, pp. 22-23.
 ABCC, Annual Report, 2005-06, p. 32.
Peter Meritz, “Paradise Postponed: a history of attempts to ensure
payment in the building and construction industry in New South
Wales”, Building and
Construction Law (BCL),
18 (3), June 2002, pp. 169-79, and Keith Redenbach, “Getting paid in
the Construction Industry”, BCL,
23 (2), April 2007, pp. 92-110; cf. Claire Mayhew, Michael Quinlan and
Laura Bennett, Effects of
subcontracting on occupational health and safety, Studies in
Australian Industrial Relations, UNSW, Kensington, 1996, pp.
 RC, Final Report, volume 11, “Achieving Cultural Change”.
 NSW Casino Control Authority, Report of Public Inquiry, 1994, p. 32; for Leighton’s collusive tendering see Report of NSW Royal Commission on Building Productivity, NSW, Parliamentary Papers, Second Session, 1992-93, vol. XXII, Paper 273, pp. 99 and 130.
 NSW Master Builders’ Association, Annual Report, 1911, no pagination; Report of the Royal Commission of inquiry into certain matters relating to the Department of Public Works, NSW, Parliamentary Papers, 1911, volume 1, pp. 681-926.
 NSW Casino Control Authority, Report, 1994, p. 32.
 Rewrite of passage from RC, Final Report, vol. 1, p. 155.
 RC, Final Report, vol. 6, p. 5; vol. 1, p. 41.
 ABCC, Annual Report, 2005-06, p. 6.
 RC, Final Report, vol. 8, pp. 111-217 on Phoenix companies; vol. 9, pp. 27-31 on superannuation, pp. 49-99 on tax evasion, and pp. 255-63 for non-compliance with compensation premiums.
 ABCC, Annual Report, 2006-7, p. 30.
 ABCC, Annual Report, 2005-06, p. 8.
 NS, August 2005, p. 21.
 NS, October 2007, pp. 35-37; “Editorial”, NSCA Australian Safety, October 2000, p. 4.
 Margaret Otlowski, “Employers’ use of genetic test information: is there a need for regulation”, ALJJ, 15 (1), May 2002, pp. 1-39.
 Donald E. Stewart, “Families and Television: content analysis”, Media Information Australia, 1983, pp. 198 and 204; Rob Crane, “Trade Union Advertising Campaigns: A Case Study”, Journal of Industrial Relations, 28 (2), June 1986, pp. 252-53n.; P. Bell et al., “Headlining risk: an analysis of occupational health and safety in the Australian press”, JOH&S ANZ, 7 (4), August 1991, pp. 273-80; International Labor and Working Class History, 59, Spring 2001, Special Issue on “Workers and Film: as subject and Audience”.
George Turner’s term for television throughout The Sea and Summer, Faber,
Marketing and Media Weekly,
Michael A. Lebowitz, “Capital and the production of needs”, Science
and Society, 41 (4), Winter 1977-78, pp. 430-47;
Dallas Smythe, “Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism”,
Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, 1 (3), Fall 1977,
pp. 1-28; Humphrey McQueen, The
Essence of Capitalism, Sceptre,
 NSCA’s Australian Safety, July 2000, p. 4.
 ABCC, Annual Report, 2005-06, p. 27.
 ABCC, Annual Report, 2005-6, p. 54.
 OFSC, Progress Report, 2005-6, pp. 11 and 24.
 OFSC, Progress Report, 2006-7, p. 13.
 RC, Final Report, v. 1, p. 45; vol. 6, pp. 40-44.
 RC, Discussion Paper 7, 2002, p. 27.
 RC, Final Report, vol. 6, pp. 40-42.
 NSCA Australian Safety, August 1999, p. 6; see also Andrew Hopkins, Lessons from Longford: the Esso gas plant explosion, CCH Australia, North Ryde, 2001, pp. 83-84.
 NSCA Australian Safety, November 2000, p. 57.
 OFSC, Progress Report, 2005-6, pp. 8 and 27; A. Costigan and D. Gardner, “Measuring performance in OHS: an investigation into the use of positive performance indicators”, JOH&S ANZ, 16 (1), February 2000, pp. 55-64; R. Mitchell, “Development of PPIs to monitor OHS performance in the Australian construction industry”, JOH&S ANZ, 16 (4), August 2000, pp. 325-31; Hopkins, Lessons from Longford, p. 71.
 OFSC, Progress Report, 2005-6, p. 27.
 NS, December 2006, p. 21.
 JOH&S ANZ, 16 (6), June 2000, p. 512; Greg Foley, “National workers’ compensation-based data”, JOH&S ANZ, 13 (3), June 1997, p. 279; R. Trethewy et al., “Improved hazard identification for contractors”, JOH&S ANZ, 16 (6), December 2000, pp. 507-20.
 RC, Discussion Paper 7, 2002, p. 28.
 NS, July 2007, p. 26; April 2008, pp. 32-7.
 Australian Safety News, February 1999, p. 50.
 Liz Bluff and Richard Johnstone, “The relationship between ‘reasonably practicable’ and risk-management regulation”, AJLL, 18 (3), November 2005, pp. 197-239.
Report on investigation into
safety certification and the operations of the WorkCover NSW Licensing
Unit, ICAC, Sydney, 2005, p. 25.
 ICAC, Report, 2005, p. 31.
 Humphrey McQueen. “Making capital tick”, Overland, 170, Autumn 2003, pp. 92-101.
 ICAC, Report, 2005, p. 20.
 Gianfranco Cresciani, Transfield The First Fifty Years, ABC Books, Sydney, 2006, pp. 114, 161-2, and 170.
 RC, Final Report, 2003, vol. 15, pp. 30-36.
 Report on investigation into safety certification and training in the NSW construction industry, ICAC, Sydney, 2004, p. 38.